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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D1ASTON, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
DOROTHY DfASTON, et al., 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 89-0050CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PETITION AND CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
Plaintiff-respondent Bruno D1Aston hereby petitions this 
Court, pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, for a rehearing of this matter. The points of law 
and fact which petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or 
misapprehended are set forth in detail in the following 
argument. Counsel for petitioner hereby certifies, by his 
signature below, that this petition is presented in good faith 
and not for delay. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does the Court's opinion improperly restrict the 
discretion of the trial court on remand by holding that the 
1973 agreement is binding as a matter of law, even though there 
exists evidence which would support the trial court in finding 
that unique and compelling circumstances exist to justify 
varying from the agreement, or that the agreement was rescinded 
by the conduct of the parties? 
2. Is the "unique and compelling circumstances" test 
adopted by this Court in conflict with prior decisions of this 
Court and of the Utah Supreme Court? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, This is an action for divorce. 
The complaint also named the parties1 two adult children as 
defendants and sought an order compelling the defendant wife 
and the children to return to the plaintiff husband certain 
personal property alleged to have been stolen from the husband. 
B. Prior and Related Proceedings. The Court's opinion 
was filed June 14, 1990, and is reported at 13 6 Utah Adv. Rep. 
47. A copy appears in Appendix A. 
A description of the proceedings below prior to the filing 
of the Notice of Appeal is set forth in the initial briefs of 
the parties. Subsequent to the filing of the Notice of Appeal, 
plaintiff ("Husband") proceeded on his claims against; defendant 
Eric Aston. An Order and Decree substantially in favor of 
plaintiff was entered on March 9, 1990. Eric Aston subsequent-
ly filed a Notice of Appeal (Case No. 900223-CA), and plaintiff 
filed a Notice of Cross Appeal (Case No. 900281-CA). The 
appeal and cross appeal were consolidated under Case No. 
2 
900223-CA by Order entered June 1, 1990. A copy of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law appears in Appendix B, 
and the Order and Decree appealed from appears in Appendix C. 
During the pendency of the instant appeal, the trial court 
found defendant ("Wife") to be in contempt of court by reason 
of her failure to comply with certain provisions of the Decree 
of Divorce. By opinion entered April 9, 1990, this Court held 
that this appeal would be dismissed unless Mrs. D1Aston 
submitted herself to the process of the trial court within 
thirty days of the issuance of the opinion. Df Aston v. 
DfAston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). (A copy of the 
opinion appears in Appendix D.) On May 4, 1990, Wife repre-
sented to this Court that she had submitted herself to the 
process of the trial court. She remained, however, in contempt 
of the trial court's order. On May 22, 1990, the trial court 
entered an Order (a copy of which is attached as Appendix E). 
The trial court gave Wife until June 22, 1990, to purge herself 
of the contempt by depositing with the court the money which 
she had previously and incorrectly represented to the court was 
in a safety deposit box. Defendant remained in contempt of 
court at the time this Court's opinion was issued on June 14, 
1990. 
C. Statement of Facts. Most of the facts relevant to 
this action are set forth in the initial briefs of the parties 
and in the Court's opinion. Such additional facts as are 
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necessary to a consideration of this petition are set forth 
below in connection with the argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The 1973 agreement which was the subject of this Court's 
opinion essentially conveyed the parties' real property to Wife 
and the personal property to Husband. Husband's personal 
property consisted largely of coin collections. The evidence 
showed and the trial court found that the parties continued to 
conduct their affairs after the execution of the 1973 agreement 
as though it did not exist. Husband presented evidence that 
his son, apparently acting under the direction and with the 
cooperation of Wife, stole most of Husband's personal property 
on April 30, 1986. The trial court did not make any finding 
as to whether the theft occurred but did hold that if the items 
which were the subject of the theft appeared in the possession 
of either party, that party would be held in contempt. Certain 
of the stolen items were subsequently found in Eric Aston's 
possession. Because Wife made herself unavailable for process, 
Husband has not yet been able to bring further proceedings 
against Wife based on this additional evidence. 
This Court's opinion, however, appears to hold that Wife 
is' entitled to all the property granted her under the 1973 
agreement as a matter of law, notwithstanding that there is 
evidence which would support a trial court finding that the 
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agreement was rescinded by the conduct of the parties, and that 
Wife participated in stealing all the property conveyed to 
Husband under the agreement. This Court holds that a post-
nuptial agreement is absolutely binding on the trial court 
unless "unique and compelling circumstances" exist. The 
"unique and compelling circumstances" test is unsupported by 
citation. Prior decisions of this Court and of the Utah 
Supreme Court have held that similar agreements entered into 
during the course of the marriage but in contemplation of 
divorce, are not binding on the trial court. Such agreements 
are considered to be a recommendation only to the court, to be 
adhered to if it is "fair and reasonable." 
There is no logical or legal justification for giving only 
advisory effect to an agreement entered into by the parties 
when they are aware of all of their current assets and cir-
cumstances, but giving conclusive effect to an agreement 
entered into at a previous time, even though circumstances may 
have changed. 
This Court should vacate its prior opinion and hold that 
a post-nuptial agreement in this case is binding between the 
parties in determining the status of property as separate as 
of the time of the divorce. The trial court should be given 
the discretion to apply traditional rules concerning the 
division of separate property in a divorce action. 
5 
Because the trial court held that the 1973 agreement was 
not intended to be enforced between the parties, the trial 
court did not have occasion to reach the issues of whether the 
agreement had been rescinded by the conduct of the parties, or 
whether the circumstances justified varying from the agreement. 
The facts on these issues are in dispute, and it is error for 
this Court to hold otherwise as a matter of law. 
Finally, appellant-wife remains in contempt of the trial 
court has failed to fully satisfy this Court's directive in its 
prior opinion. The appeal should be dismissed because appel-
lant failed to comply with this Court's prior opinion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE HOLDING OF THIS COURT IMPROPERLY 
RESTRICTS THE DISCRETION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT ON REMAND. 
A. Unique And Compelling Circumstances Exist To Justify 
Varying From The 1973 Agreement. 
Bruno D1Aston ("Husband") testified at trial that on April 
30, 1986, after he had returned from a coin show in the State 
of Washington, Dorothy ("Wife") invited him to share coffee 
with her. While Wife was thus occupying him, their son, Eric 
Aston, broke into Husband's vehicle and removed hundreds of 
thousands of dollars worth of coins and other valuable assets. 
Eric then returned and stated to his father, in the presence 
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of his mother, that he, Eric, had removed the coins because 
"we" could no longer trust Bruno D'Aston. (Tr. 60.) The items 
stolen included nearly all of the assets conveyed to Husband 
under the 1973 agreement. 
Wife and Eric disputed Husband's testimony. The trial 
court determined that it was not necessary to make a finding 
as to what occurred, because the trial court held that the 1973 
agreement was not enforceable in any event. This Court 
disagreed and held the 1973 agreement to be enforceable. This 
Court held that post-nuptial agreements are enforceable unless 
"unique and compelling circumstances" exist to justify varying 
from the agreement. Husband establishes below in Point II that 
the "unique and compelling circumstances" test is not proper. 
Even if the test is applied, however, unique and compelling 
circumstances exist in this case. 
This Court does not define what would constitute "unique 
and compelling circumstances," but states in a footnote that 
"[t]he trial court made no findings to delineate what it found 
as compelling circumstances to justify such an action and we 
find none." 13 6 Utah Adv. Rep. at 50, n. 6. The trial court 
did not delineate what it found as compelling circumstances, 
however, because it had found the 1973 agreement to be un-
enforceable in any event. 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have had several 
occasions to consider what constitutes sufficient grounds to 
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divide separate property. A review of the cases demonstrates 
that the same test should be applied in this case, and that the 
evidence in this case was sufficient to justify varying from 
the post-nuptial agreement. 
In Noble v. Noble, 761 P. 2d 1369 (Utah 1988) , for example, 
the Court held that the trial court properly awarded a portion 
of the husband's separate property to the wife where the wife 
had no income or assets and where her present financial needs 
were the result of the husband's tortious conduct. This Court 
asserts that Noble is distinguishable because it did not 
involve a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement. The critical 
issue, however, is that the standard applied in Noble is the 
same as this Court has previously held applies where a property 
settlement agreement has been made. The Court in Noble held: 
[T]here is no per se ban on awarding one 
spouse a portion of the premarital assets 
of another. In fact, our cases have 
consistently held that under appropriate 
circumstances, achieving a fair, just, and 
equitable result may require that the trial 
court exercise its discretion to award one 
spouse the premarital property of the 
other. 
761 P.2d at 1373 (citations omitted). 
This language is remarkably similar to that used in 
Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), a case 
which did involve a postnuptial agreement (although executed 
in contemplation of divorce): 
[I]t is well recognized that a parties1 
stipulation as to property rights in a 
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divorce action, although advisory and 
usually followed unless the court finds it 
to be unfair or unreasonable, is not 
necessarily binding on the trial court. 
It is only a recommendation to be adhered 
to if the court believes it to be fair and 
reasonable. 
743 P.2d at 789 (citations omitted). 
Theft must certainly be considered to be a compelling 
circumstance. Evidence exists which would support a finding 
that Wife stole the coins from Husband. Although the location 
of the coins was not known at the time this case was tried, 
some of the coins have subsequently been discovered in Eric 
Aston1s possession. This corroborates Husband's testimony that 
Eric and Dorothy DfAston conspired to steal the coins from 
Husband. 
The Court's holding leaves Husband without an effective 
remedy. Wife assisted in the theft of all of the assets 
conveyed to Husband under the 1973 agreement, but this Court 
nonetheless prohibits the trial court from ordering her to make 
compensation to Husband from the assets she received under the 
1973 agreement. 
The trial court should be granted discretion to make 
whatever orders are necessary and just in this case. Having 
held that the trial court was in error in its interpretation 
of the 1973 agreement, this Court should now remand the case 
to the trial court to make whatever decree is just and ap-
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propriate under the circumstances of the case, yet in harmony 
with this Court's interpretation of the agreement. 
B. The 1973 Agreement Was Rescinded By Conduct. 
This Court held that post-nuptial agreements are to be 
interpreted the same as any other contract. As such, as with 
pre-nuptial agreements, the contract can be rescinded by the 
conduct of the parties. In re Marriage of Young, 682 P.2d 
1233, 1236 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); see also Berman v. Berman, 
749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Because the trial court in this case held that the post-
nuptial agreement was never intended to be binding between the 
parties, the court had no occasion to determine whether the 
agreement was subsequently rescinded by the conduct of the 
parties. The court did find, however, that "subsequent to the 
date of the agreement, the parties continued their married 
lives together, and bought and sold property as though the 
agreement did not really exist, except that certain real 
properties were changed to the name of defendant Dorothy 
D'Aston." (R. 456.) There is adequate evidence to support 
this finding, as demonstrated in the parties1 initial briefs. 
Those findings must be upheld: 
We will not set aside a trial court's 
finding of fact unless it is against the 
clear weight of the evidence or we other-
wise reach a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been mae. [Citations.] 
We may regard a finding as clearly er-
roneous only if the finding is without 
adequate evidentiary support or is induced 
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by an erroneous view of the law, [Cita-
tions, ] 
Smith v, Linmar Energy Corp,, 790 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (J. Billings). 
The testimony in this case is sufficient to support the 
findings. To the extent that Husband's evidence was weaker 
than Wife's, it was because Wife had denied Husband access to 
his records, (R. 754, 757.) This Court should grant the trial 
court discretion on remand to further inquire into that issue 
and make detailed findings as to whether the agreement was 
rescinded by the conduct of the parties. 
POINT II 
THE "UNIQUE AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AND CONFLICTS WITH 
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
A. The 1973 Agreement Determines Only The Status Of The 
Property, And Not Its Ultimate Disposition By The Divorce 
Court. 
Husband does not, for the purposes of this Petition for 
Rehearing, contest this Court's holding that the parties 
intended the 1973 agreement to be binding, and that the agree-
ment was unambiguous. Husband respectfully submits, however, 
that this Court has misinterpreted the agreement. The critical 
portion of the agreement states as follows: 
3. Hereafter, and until this agree-
ment is modified in writing attached 
hereto, all property, real, personal and 
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mixed, acquired by either party in his or 
her sole name, from whatever source derived 
and wherever situated, shall be the sole 
and separate property of such person, 
notwithstanding any law, statute, or court 
decision giving presumptive effect to the 
status of marriage; and such property shall 
be free of all claims, demand [sic] or 
liens of the other, direct or indirect, and 
however derived. 
Defendant's Exhibit 37 (emphasis added). 
This Court held that the emphasized portion clearly 
indicated an intent that the agreement be binding and con-
clusive on any divorce court. 136 Utah Adv. Rep. at 49. The 
agreement does not, however, state that it is binding on any 
"court decision." It is only intended to be binding on those 
court decisions which give "presumptive effect to the status 
of marriage." In other words, the agreement prohibits the 
court from presuming, solely by reason of the marriage, that 
the property was community or marital property. The agreement 
only determines the status of the property as separate. 
This argument is supported by Parkhurst v. Gibson, 573 
A.2d 454 (N.H. 1990). The prenuptial agreement at issue in 
that case stated, among other things, that "[i]t is mutually 
declared that it is the intention of the parties to this 
agreement that by virtue of their prospective marriage neither 
one shall have nor acquire any right, title or claim in and to 
the real or personal estate of the other party . . . ." 573 
A.2d at 456. The agreement did not however, specifically use 
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the words "divorce," "alimony," or "property settlement," but 
appeared to be directed at determining the status of the 
parties1 property for inheritance purposes. The subject 
agreement in this case similarly does not specifically refer 
to divorce or to a property settlement in divorce, and should 
be read as only determining the status of the property as 
separate. 
Husband does not contest, for the purposes of this Peti-
tion for Rehearing, that the 1973 agreement conclusively 
establishes the status of the property as separate. In Utah, 
the general rule is that "in appropriate circumstances, equity 
will require that each party retain the separate property 
brought to the marriage." Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 
(Utah 1987). By designating the property as separate, there-
fore, the 1973 agreement created a presumption that the proper-
ty would remain the property of Wife. The trial court must 
treat the property as separate property. As with any separate 
property, however, the court can order one party to convey 
portions of his or her separate property to the other in order 
to achieve equity under the circumstances of the case. Id. 
Although the agreement mandates that the property be dealt with 
by a divorce court as separate property, nothing in the agree-
ment can be read as prohibiting the divorce court from other-
wise treating the property the same as any other separate 
property. 
13 
B. No Logical Or Legal Basis Exists To Give Greater 
Effect To A Post-Nuptial Agreement Than To A Property Settle-
ment Agreement. 
In Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
the court considered the effect to be given to a property 
settlement agreement executed in contemplation of a divorce. 
The court held as follows: 
[I]t is well recognized that a parties1 
stipulation as to property rights in a 
divorce action, although advisory and 
usually followed unless the court finds it 
to be unfair or unreasonable, is not 
necessarily binding on the trial court. 
It is only a recommendation to be adhered 
to if the court believes it to be fair and 
reasonable. 
743 P.2d at 789 (citing Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 
(Utah 1987); Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 1975)). 
It is not clear from the court's opinion in Coleman 
whether the property settlement agreement was executed prior 
to the commencement of the divorce action or during the penden-
cy of the divorce proceedings. The distinction does not appear 
critical for the purposes of that decision. 
In the instant action, in contrast, the court holds that 
if a property settlement agreement is executed at some un-
specified earlier time, at a time when the parties are not 
immediately contemplating divorce but at a time when divorce 
is certainly foreseeable, the agreement becomes not merely 
advisory if "fair and reasonable," but conclusively binding 
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unless "unique and compelling" circumstances exist. This Court 
does not cite to any prior case law establishing such a dis-
tinction, and Husband is not aware of any. 
Husband respectfully submits that no logical basis exists 
for giving greater effect to a postnuptial agreement (whether 
executed one year or twenty years before the divorce) than to 
a property settlement agreement. Logic would dictate that the 
pre-divorce (postnuptial) agreement be given less weight, not 
greater. A property settlement agreement is entered into with 
the contemplation that it will be enforced within a short 
period of time after execution. The parties are presumably 
aware of all the facts and circumstances which will be in 
existence at the time the agreement is enforced. The post-
nuptial agreement in this case, in contrast, was executed 
nearly fifteen years before enforcement was sought. There has 
been a vast and material change in circumstances subsequent to 
the execution of the agreement. Husband respectfully submits 
that there is no legal or logical reason for giving greater 
effect to the contract which was executed with less knowledge.1 
Alternatively, this Court should adopt the standards for 
enforcement of a prenuptial (or postnuptial) agreement as set 
forth in Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987). The 
court held that the following three criteria are generally 
considered in determining whether to enforce such an agreement: 
1. Was the agreement obtained through fraud, 
duress or mistake, or misrepresentation or nondis-
closure of material fact? 
15 
It is important to emphasize that Husband does not dis-
pute, for purposes of this Point, that the 1973 agreement 
mandates that the trial court treat the designated properties 
as separate property. Once the property is properly labeled 
as either separate or marital, however, the trial court should 
be granted a latitude of discretion in dividing the property 
equal or greater to that applicable when dealing with a proper-
ty settlement agreement. 
Once it is determined that the property is separate, the 
following guidelines apply in determining whether it should be 
divided: 
Premarital property, gifts, and in-
heritances may be viewed as separate 
property, and in appropriate circumstances, 
equity will require that each party retain 
the separate property brought to the 
marriage. However, the rule is not invari-
able. In fashioning an equitable property 
division, trial courts need consider all 
of the pertinent circumstances. The 
factors generally to be considered are the 
amount and kind of property to be divided; 
whether the property was acquired before 
or during the marriage; the source of the 
property; the health of the parties; the 
2. Was the agreement unconscionable when 
executed? 
3. Have the facts and circumstances changed 
since the agreement was executed, so as to make its 
enforcement unfair and unreasonable? 
Brooks, 733 P.2d at 1049 (citing Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 
635, 292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1982)). The "unfair and unreason-
able" test in the third factor is identical to that applied by 
Utah courts with respect to property settlement agreements. 
Coleman, 743 P.2d at 789. 
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parties1 standard of living, respective 
financial conditions, needs, and earning 
capacity; the duration of the marriage; the 
children of the marriage; the parties1 ages 
at time of marriage and of divorce; what 
the parties gave up by the marriage; and 
the necessary relationship the property 
division has with the amount of alimony and 
child support to be awarded. Of particular 
concern in a case such as this is whether 
one spouse has made any contribution toward 
the growth of the separate assets of the 
other spouse and whether the assets were 
accumulated or enhanced by the joint 
efforts of the parties. 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) (footnotes 
omitted) . The trial court did not have any reason to make 
findings on these issues, because it had already determined 
that the 1973 agreement was not enforceable and that all the 
property was marital property. The trial court should be 
permitted on remand to exercise its discretion in accordance 
with the principles set forth above. 
POINT III 
WIFE SHOULD BE GRANTED NO RELIEF WHERE SHE 
REMAINED IN CONTEMPT OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
In its prior decision in this case, this Court held that 
Wife was required to "submit herself to the jurisdiction of the 
trial court and satisfy that court's concerns before she may 
exercise that right [to appeal]. 790 P. 2d at 594. Wife failed 
to comply with this requirement. Although she did appear at 
a hearing, she remained in contempt of the trial court. This 
Court's second opinion should be vacated until and unless Wife 
17 
purges the contempt. Wife may and should be punished for her 
contempt even though the underlying order may be incorrect. 
See In re Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 733 P.2d 795 (Ct. 
App. 1987). 
Wife failed to "satisfy" the trial court's concerns within 
the time frame previously set by this Court. The appeal should 
be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Husband does not contest, for purposes of this Petition, 
this Court's holding that the 1973 agreement was intended to 
be binding by the parties. The agreement by its terms, how-
ever, only identifies the property as separate. Prior deci-
sions of this Court and of the Utah Supreme Court provide that 
the trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, require 
a party to make a conveyance of separate property when neces-
sary to achieve equity. 
Even under the "unique and compelling circumstances" test 
adopted by this Court, the evidence would support a finding 
that such circumstances existed. 
The Court's opinion should be modified and the holding 
limited to determining that the 1973 agreement was intended to 
be binding between the parties. This Court should hold that 
the agreement determined the status of the property to be 
separate and should remand the case to the trial court to deal 
18 
with the property as separate property in accordance with prior 
decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. 
Finally, the appeal should be dismissed because Wife did 
not bring herself into compliance with the trial court's order 
prior to the issuance of this Court's second opinion. 
DATED this day of July, 1990. 
S. REX LEWIS and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
12th day of July, 1990. 
Brian C. Harrison, for: 
HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON 
3 325 No. University Avenue 
Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84 604 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
D1Aston v. D'Aston, 
136 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (Ct. App. June 14, 1990) 
AQV. KeP. 4 / ^o way ' 
agreed upon. 
In its findings of fact, the trial court deter-
mined that the initial two leases negotiated by 
Galaxy Advertising authorized the placement 
of the signs on specific sites which were the 
same locations occupied by the signs at the 
time the present parties executed the existing 
lease, and that the parties intended the lease to 
continue Reagan's right to maintain the signs 
only in their existing locations. Although the 
evidence is controverted, "we assume that the 
trial judge believed those aspects of the evid-
ence and the inferences reasonably drawn 
from them that support his decision." Redev-
elopment Agency, 785 P.2d at 1122 (quoting 
Brixen & Christopher, Architects v. Elton, 111 
P.2d 1037, 1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Under 
our standard of review, we will not set aside a 
trial court's findings unless they are against 
the clear weight of the evidence or we other-
wise reach a definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been made, Smith v. Linmar 
Energy Corp., 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 53 (Ct. 
App. 1990), and we give deference to the trial 
court's findings and its opportunity to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a). 
Having examined the record, we conclude 
that the trial court's findings have adequate 
evidentiary support and are not clearly erro-
neous. We, therefore, affirm its judgment. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. The 1971 leases described the locations as 
follows: (1) one location across from state road shed 
on highway, and (2) one location 300 feet south of 
state road shed on highway. 
2. Reid stated that it was his intent to work out an 
Cite as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Bruno D'ASTON, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Dorothy D'ASTON, et al., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890050-CA 
FILED: June 14, 1990 
Fourth District, Utah County 
Honorable Boyd L. Park 
ATTORNEYS: 
Brian C. Harrison, Provo, for Appellant 
S. Rex Lewis and Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston ("Wife"), 
appeals from a divorce decree entered by the 
district court, principally claiming the court 
erred in failing to distribute the parties' pro-
perty pursuant to a postnuptial agreement. 
On appeal, Bruno D'Aston ("Husband") 
responded that since Wife was in contempt of 
the trial court and was avoiding court process, 
this court should not consider her appeal on 
the merits. We agreed with Husband and 
ordered Wife to submit herself to the process 
of the trial court within 30 days or we would 
dismiss her appeal. See D'Aston v. DfAston, 
132 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Ct. App. 1990). Wife 
gave us notice of her compliance with our 
order on May 4, 1990, and therefore we 
address the merits' of her appeal in this 
opinion. 
We agree with Wife's contention that the 
trial court erred in failing to distribute the 
parties' property pursuant to their postnuptial 
agreement and therefore reverse and remand. 
Husband and Wife divorced on December 
15, 1988, after a 35-year marriage. In 1973, 
Husband asked Wife to enter into a written 
property agreement, which had been prepared 
by his attorney. The agreement was executed 
by both parties in 1973, then notarized and 
recorded in the State of California in 1975. 
Under the 1973 agreement, Wife received 
two parcels of real estate and cash. Husband 
received all real property outside the United 
States; personal property in his possession, 
which included SI million in coins and a col-
lection of antique cars; and all domestic and 
foreign patents and patent rights. The agree-
ment also provided that all propertv acauired 
agreement whereby they 
could keep the signs next to the highway 
and if he built or developed — well, 
we realized that if he came up with 
another use for the property that was 
more economically profitable for him, 
that at that point in time it might come 
about that we might have to remove the 
signs. But until that happened, or if he 
only developed pan of it, or whatever, 
that we would like to have the ability to 
stay on the property until he had totally 
utilized the property .... My understan-
ding is that if part of it were developed 
and a piece was left undeveloped, that 
you could relocate the sign. 
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by either party in his/her own name would 
be the separate property of that person. 
Finally, the agreement provided that the 
parties would execute documents to implement 
the agreement, and that each had the advice of 
counsel, had read the agreement, and had not 
signed the agreement under duress, fraud or 
undue influence. Shortly after the agreement 
was signed, the parties conveyed the property 
as provided in the agreement. 
On May 2, 1986, Husband filed for divorce. 
Husband claimed that much of the tangible 
personal property given to him under the 1973 
agreement had been stolen on April 30, 1986, 
the day Wife had asked him to leave their 
home. On July 31, 1986, Husband's Califo-
rnia attorney, who had drafted the 1973 agr-
eement, sent a letter to Wife's Utah attorney 
which stated the 1973 agreement was in full 
force and effect. 
Both parties at trial acknowledged they 
executed the 1973 agreement voluntarily and 
did not execute it under duress, fraud or 
undue influence. However, at trial, Husband 
claimed the 1973 agreement should not control 
the disposition of the parties' property in this 
divorce action because the agreement was 
entered into only to protect the couple's assets 
from possible creditors in pending litigation, 
not to distribute property in the event of 
divorce. Wife at trial claimed she had no 
knowledge of the alleged pending litigation 
and assumed the 1973 agreement was to 
control for all purposes, including the possi-
bility of divorce. 
The trial court held the 1973 agreement was 
not intended to control in the event of 
divorce, and thus, equitably divided all of the 
parties' property and awarded no alimony to 
either party. Wife appeals, claiming that (1) 
the trial court erred in dividing the parties' 
separate property in this divorce action cont-
rary to the terms of the 1973 agreement, (2) 
the trial court erred in denying Wife alimony, 
and (3) the conduct of the trial judge constit-
uted judicial bias. 
VALIDITY OF POSTNUPTIAL 
AGREEMENTS 
In Utah, prenuptial agreements are enforc-
eable as long as there is no fraud, coercion or 
material nondisclosure.1 Utah's courts have 
not yet considered the enforceability of post-
nuptial agreements not in contemplation of 
divorce.. However, other jurisdictions review 
postnuptial property agreements under the 
same standards as those applied to prenuptial 
agreements.2 
We agree with the majority of our neighb-
oring jurisdictions and thus hold that a post-
nuptial agreement is enforceable in Utah 
absent fraud, coercion, or material nondiscl-
osure.3 
Neither Husband nor Wife assert that the 
icm nrnnerrv agreement was entered into as a 
v. Rep. 47 rrovo. uimi 
result of fraud or coercion nor do they 
contend that there was material nondisclosure 
of the parties' assets. Thus, this postnuptial 
agreement should be enforced pursuant to its 
terms. 
Our conclusion, however, does not resolve 
this controversy as Husband and Wife disagree 
as to the meaning and scope of the 1973 pos-
tnuptial property agreement. Wife contends 
the agreement by its unambiguous terms 
applies in the event of divorce. Husband 
argues that it was executed merely to protect 
the parties' property from creditors and was 
not intended to control a distribution of the 
parties' property in the event of divorce. 
Thus, we must determine what the parties 
intended when they entered into this 1973 
agreement. 
Utah courts have applied general contract 
principles when interpreting prenuptial agree-
ments. See Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 
1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (A prenuptial 
agreement should be treated like any other 
contract. "In interpreting contracts, the prin-
cipal concern is to determine what the parties 
intended by what they said."). This approach 
is consistent with other jurisdictions' treat-
ment of postnuptial agreements.4 
Thus, in order to resolve Husband and 
Wife's disagreement as to the scope and 
meaning of this postnuptial agreement, we 
apply normal rules of contract construction. 
The core principle is that in construing this 
contract, we first look to the four corners of 
the agreement to determine the parties' inte-
ntions. See Neilson v. Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264, 
1267 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Ron Case 
Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v. Blomquist, 
773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); LDS Hosp. 
v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 
(Utah 1988); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
The relevant provisions of the 1973 agree-
ment denoting its scope and application state, 
with our emphasis: 
1. The husband does transfer, 
bargain, convey and quitclaim to 
the wife all of his right, title and 
interest, if any there be, in and to 
the following: 
(a) The real property at 14211 
Skyline Drive, Hacienda Heights, 
California and in and to ail build-
ings, appurtenances and fixtures 
thereon. 
(b) The real property at 230 
South Ninth Avenue, City of Ind-
ustry, California, including all 
buildings, appurtenances and fixt-
ures thereon, and any and all oil 
and mineral rights thereto. 
(c) Any and all cash in bank 
accounts located in the State of 
California. 
2. The wife transfers, bargains, 
conveys and quitclaims to the 
husband ail of her right, title and 
interest in and to real property 
located outside of the United States 
of America, and in and to all per-
sonal property in the possession of 
the husband, or subject to his 
control in the United States, Europe 
or elsewhere in the world, and in 
and to all patents or patent rights 
under the laws of the United States, 
United Kingdom or any common-
wealth thereof, Switzerland, Japan 
or other countries. The provisions 
of this paragraph apply to all pro-
perty described herein, whether 
presently owned or in existence or 
to be acquired or created in the 
future. 
3. Hereafter, and until this agree-
ment is modified in writing attached 
hereto, all property, real, personal 
and mixed, acquired by either party 
in his or her sole name, from wha-
tever source derived and wherever 
situated, shall be the sole and sep-
arate property of such person, not-
withstanding any law, statute or 
court decision giving presumptive 
effect to the status of marriage; and 
such property shall be free of all 
claims, demand or liens of the 
other, direct or indirect, and 
however derived. 
This postnuptial agreement provides that 
Husband and Wife's propeny will be divided 
and the division will control for all purposes. 
The agreement was entered into in a commu-
nity property state and the contractual lang-
uage unambiguously and specifically refers to 
rebutting the presumption that all property 
acquired during the marriage is community 
property. 
The trial court did not expressly conclude 
that the 1973 property agreement was ambig-
uous, but nevertheless proceeded to take ext-
rinsic evidence5 as to the parties' intentions 
and, based upon this controverted extrinsic 
evidence, concluded that the parties did not 
intend the 1973 agreement ta apply in the 
event of divorce. 
The threshold determination of whether a 
writing is ambiguous is a question of law, 
Buehner Block Co., 752 P.2d at 895; Faulkner 
v. Famsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 
1983); Whitehouse v. Whitehouser 131 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 28r 30 (Ct. App. 1990), and thus 
we review a trial court's determination under 
a„ -correction-of-error standard, according 
no particular deference to the trial court. Id.; 
see also Seashores Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 
645, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
We find this postnuptial agreement unam-
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biguousiy provides that it will apply to a dis-
position of the parties' propeny in the event 
of divorce.6 Thus, we reverse the trial court's 
contrary ruling which was based upon extrinsic 
evidence as to what Husband and Wife inte-
nded by their 1973 agreement. 
In summary, we reverse the trial court's 
property distribution and remand for enforc-
ement of the 1973 postnuptial property agre-
ement and then the division of the remaining 
property, if any, not controlled by it. Because 
we reverse and remand the property division, 
we also reverse and remand on the issue of 
alimony. We believe our decision necessitates 
the reconsideration of whether either Husband 
or Wife should receive alimony.7 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. See Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 
1986) ("it should be noted that in general, prenuptiai 
agreements concerning the disposition of propeny 
owned by the parties at the time of their marriage 
are valid so long as there is no fraud, coercion or 
material nondisclosure"); Berman v. Berman, 749 
P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
2. See In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 449 
P.2d 7, 16 (1969) (en banc) ("[M]arital partners may 
in Arizona validly divide their property presently 
and prospectively by a post-nuptial agreement, 
even without its being incident to a contemplated 
separation or divorce," provided it is fair and equi-
table and is free from fraud, coercion or undue 
influence and that "wife acted with full knowledge 
of the propeny involved and her rights therein."); In 
re Estate of Lewin, 42 Colo. App. 129, 595 P.2d 
1055, 1057 (1979) ("Nuptial agreements, whether 
executed before or after the marriage, are enforce-
able in Colorado [and a] nuptial agreement will be 
upheld unless the person attacking it proves fraud, 
concealment, or failure to disclose material infor-
mation."). See also In re Estate of Loughmiller, 229 
Kan. 584, 629 P.2d 156, 162 (1981) (postnuptial 
agreements, fairly and understanding^ made, are 
enforceable); In re Estate of Gab, 364 N.W.2d 924, 
925-26 (S.D. 1985) (postnuptial agreement to 
protect inheritance rights valid if property fairly 
disclosed and spouse enters into freely and for good 
consideration); Button v. Button, 131 Wis. 2d 84, 
388 N.W.2d 546, 550-51 (1986) (postnuptial agre-
ement must meet requirements of fair and reason-
able disclosure, entered into voluntarily and freely, 
and substantive provisions fair to each spouse). But 
cf. Ching v. Ching, 751 P.2d 93, 97 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1988) (general rule that propeny agreements should 
be enforced absent fraud or unconscionability 
applies to prenuptiai, but not to postnuptial, agre-
ements). 
3. This postnuptial agreement was entered into in 
California. Under California law, married couples 
may contract to change the separate or community 
status of their property. Cal. Civil Code §5103 
(1990); In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 
551 P.2d 323, 328 n.6, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976). 
Further, married couples may enter into contracts 
with each other concerning their property rights as 
though unmarried, subject to rules controlling 
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actions of persons occupying confidential relations 
with each other. Haseltme v. Haseltme, 203 Cai. 
App. 2d 48, 21 Cai. Rptr. 238, 244 (1962); In re 
Estate of Marsh, 151 Cai. App. 2d 356, 311 P.2d 
596, 599 (1957). California law is in harmony with 
Utah law on the issue of the enforceability and int-
erpretation of postnuptial agreements and thus we 
need not resolve the issue of which state's law 
should apply. 
4. See Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d 
629, 633 (1978) (" [Contracts, made either before or 
after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix pro-
perty rights between a husband and wife, are to be 
liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of 
the makers and to uphold such contracts where they 
are fairly and understandably made, are just and 
equitable in their provisions, and are not obtained 
by fraud or overreaching."); Roberts v. Roberts, 381 
So. 2d 1333, 1335 (Miss. 1980) ("The rules applic-
able to the construction of written contracts in 
general are to be applied in construing a postnuptial 
agreement."); Bosone v. Bosone, 53 Wash. App. 
614, 768 P.2d 1022, 1024-25 (1989) ("a community 
property agreement is a contract, and effect should 
be given to the clearly expressed intent of the 
parties"). 
5. "Resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent 
is permissible only if the contract document appears 
to express the parties' agreement incompletely or if 
it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement." 
Neilson, 780 P.2d at 1267; see also Anderson v. 
Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 1982) (only when an 
ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by an 
objective and reasonable interpretation of the agre-
ement as a whole should the court resort to evidence 
beyond the four corners of the agreement). 
6. Husband argues on appeal that even if we find 
the trial court erred when it found the 1973 agree-
ment was not intended to apply in the event of a 
divorce, the error was harmless because of the broad 
equitable powers trial courts possess in domestic 
matters. See Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). However, even if a trial court 
has the equitable power to disregard an otherwise 
enforceable postnuptial property settlement agree-
ment and to distribute the separate property of the 
spouses, the circumstances must be unique and 
compelling to justify the application of such an 
exception. The trial court made no findings to deli-
neate what it found as compelling circumstances to 
justify such an action and we find none. 
In support of his argument, Husband claims that 
Utah courts have distributed premarital, gift or 
inheritance property of one spouse to the other 
spouse. See Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 
(Utah 1988); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 
(Utah 1987); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 
1147-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Peterson v. Pete-
rson, 748 P.2d 593, 595-96 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
We find these cases clearly distinguishable as they 
do not involve an otherwise enforceable prenuptial 
or postnuptial agreement. 
Husband also argues that Utah courts may refuse 
to apply property settlement agreements in a divorce 
action. Sec Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 
1975); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). Again, these cases do not deal with 
postnuptial property settlement agreements not in 
contemplation of divorce and are otherwise factually 
distinguishable. 
7. We need not consider the issue of whether the 
ersed the trial court's property distribution on other 
grounds. 
Cite as 
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v. 
Harry Jamar Gordon, 
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R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra Sjogren, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee State of Utah 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and 
Greenwood. 
OPINION 
BU-LINGS, Judge: 
We have consolidated two criminal, interl-
ocutory appeals for decision as they present 
the identical legal issue. Appellants Vaughn 
Humphrey ("Humphrey") and Harry Jamar 
Gordon ("Gordon7') appeal from two separate 
decisions of a district court wherein the trial 
judge concluded the district court did not have 
jurisdiction to review defendants' bindover 
orders from circuit court. We affirm. 
Humphrey was charged with sixteen second 
or third degree felonies. Gordon was charged 
with manslaughter, a second degree felony. In 
both cases, the circuit court held preliminary 
hearings and bound defendants over for trial. 
Both defendants were ultimately arraigned 
before the district court. 
Subsequently, Humphrey and Gordon each 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, 
Defendant. 
LISA ASTON and ERIC 
ASTON, 
Co-defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. CV 86 1124 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause against co-defendant Eric Aston and plaintiff's 
Motion for an Order directing the delivery of certain personal property to plaintiff came on 
regularly for hearing before the Hon. Ray M. Harding of the above-entitled Court on January 
8, 9 and 22, 1990. The plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis and 
Kevin J. Sutterfield, co-defendant Eric Aston was present and represented by his counsel, 
Keith W. Meade. The Court, having received evidence and heard testimony of the parties and 
other witnesses, considered the memoranda of the parties, heard argument of counsel, having 
issued its Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, being fully advised in the premises, 
and good cause appearing therefor, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court herein entered a Decree of Divorce on or about December 15, 1988, 
whereby it awarded various personal property to the plaintiff, including various items which 
plaintiff alleges were removed from his car and his motor home on or prior to April 30, 1986. 
2. The divorce decree also awarded to plaintiff a one-half interest in various 
personal property located at the marital home of 1171 No. Oakmont, Provo, Utah ("marital 
home"). 
3. The Decree of Divorce awarded the marital home to defendant Dorothy 
D'Aston. 
4. The Decree of Divorce also awarded to the plaintiff other personal items, 
including cameras, lenses, carrying cases, and other optical equipment. 
5. Prior to the separation of plaintiff and defendant Dorothy D'Aston, plaintiff 
was involved for numerous years in the buying, selling, and collecting of coins, rare coins, and 
other similar items. 
6. On many of plaintiff's rare coins, he stamped the rim above the head with 
the letter "A." 
7. Shortly after the plaintiff's personal property disappeared in April, 1986, 
plaintiff was able to make a detailed list for the police department from his memory of many 
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of the missing items. Some of those items, while not exceptionally rare, would not be expected 
to appear in an average coin shop. 
8. On March 15, 1989, Eric Aston made and executed a Bill of Sale to Lloyd Ross 
Engle and Jan Chapman Engle to various items of personal property located in the marital 
home. Eric Aston assisted in the sale of the real property and accepted a quit claim deed 
from defendant Dorothy D'Aston aka Dorothy Aston on March 14, 1989. On the same date, 
Eric Aston executed a warranty deed to the Engles for the sale of the marital home. At the 
closing of the sale of the property on March 14, 1989, Eric Aston received two trust account 
checks from Provo Land Title Company, one for the sum of $58,144.44, and one for the sum 
of $58,144.48, for a total cash receipt of $116,288.92. 
9. On April 14, 1989, this Court issued its Writ of Execution and Assistance. 
Pursuant to that Writ, John Sindt, a constable of Salt Lake County, took various items into his 
possession on April 29, 1989, from co-defendant Eric Aston. 
10. The various property identified as Exhibit 7 at the hearing hereof obtained 
by Constable Sindt, was previously located at co-defendant Eric Aston's business known as The 
Gold Connection at approximately 21st South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
11. Many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins, even those which were 
unusual, unexplainably appeared in Eric Aston's coin shop. Several of the coins reported 
missing by plaintiff were stamped with an "A." Identical coins bearing an "A" were found 
among the coins in co-defendant Eric Aston's inventory. 
12. Though given an opportunity, co-defendant Eric Aston has not adequately 
explained why he had so many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins. 
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13. Within the past several months, co-defendant Eric Aston has made significant 
purchases, including inventory for his coin shop, several automobiles, and two separate 
condominiums. Co-defendant Eric Aston has not plausibly explained the manner and source 
of the funds sufficient to purchase the inventory for his coin shop, the automobiles, and 
property he has recently acquired. 
14. The Court finds and reasonably infers that much of the capital for co-
defendant Eric Aston's recent purchases came from the sale of plaintiff's coins, many of which 
are still missing. 
15. The Court also finds and reasonably infers that co-defendant Eric Aston had 
several coins in his possession identical to plaintiff's missing coins because those coins were 
actually taken by co-defendant Eric Aston. 
16. The parties have stipulated that co-defendant Eric Aston claims no interest 
in the cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment found in co-defendant Eric Aston's store, 
and that the Court can enter an order awarding the same to plaintiff, which items were 
received by plaintiff at the time of the hearing herein. 
17. The parties have also stipulated that plaintiff makes no claim to various 
dimes, pennies, nickels, quarters, one-half dollars, dollars, and panda bullion which can be 
awarded to co-defendant Eric Aston and were received by him at the time of the hearing 
herein. 
18. Plaintiff has met his burden of proving ownership to many of the items 
entered as evidence herein. Plaintiff is the owner of all coins which bear an "A" stamp, 
including all of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp. A list of the "A" 
stamped coins held by the Court is as follows: 
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Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin 
- Liberty 
- Liberty 
1892 P Morgan Silver Dollar 
1890 Carson City Silver Dollar 
1879 Metric Proof U. S. Dollar 
1871 S U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty 
1914 S U. S. $20 Gold Coin - St. Gaudins 
1 set Diving Goose Canadian Dollar 
1881 O Morgan Silver Dollar 
1890 CC Morgan Silver Dollar 
1922 D Peace Dollar 
1923 S 
1924 S 
1934 D 
1896 S 
1904 S 
19. Plaintiff is also the owner of the items held by the Court which match those 
items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to the police. These 
items on plaintiff's first list of stolen property are as follows: 
Complete set of coins of The Golden West (36 coins in set plus 2 Calif, coins). 
U. S. Gold Dollars 
1 1849 - AU 
2 1853 - AU 
$2 111 U. S. Gold 
1 1905 - UNC 
1 1915 - AU 
1 1911 - D 
$10 U. S. Gold 
1 1910 - D - UNC 
1 1915 - UNC 
$20 U. S. Gold 
1 1871 - AU 
1 1897 - BU 
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1 1914 - S - BU 
1 1925 - BU 
1 18.5 gram Alaska gold nugget 
2,013 oz. silver bullion (1-oz. rounds; 5-oz. bars; 10-oz. bars; 100-oz. bars) 
187 Libertads (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985) 
Canada Dollars 
13 1958 - BU 
20 1962 - BU 
45 1963 - BU 
120 1964 - BU 
137 1965 - Type 1, BU, Type 2 BU, Type 3 BU, Type 4 BU and Type 5 BU 
60 1966 - LB - BU 
1 1967 - D.G. 45° - BU 
120 1967 - BU 
6 1967 - Canada proof sets with $20 Gold 
470 1984 - proof dollars and case 
U. S. Proof & Gem Silver Dollars 
1 1879 - Metric proof 
5 coins of 13 coin Gem set MS - 65 - CC - dollars consisting of 1-1879; 1-1882; 1-1883; 
1-1884; and 1-1890. 
84 Common dates BU - dollars 
60 Common dates CIRC - dollars 
Miscellaneous Gold 
6 1-oz. - K - Krugeran. 
1 1-oz. - M - Mapleleaf. 
3 Mex - 2 Peso 
3 Mex - 2 1/2 Peso 
2 Mex - 1947 - 50 Peso - BU 
Stamps - one book. 
6 
20. Plaintiff's later inventories do not appear to have the same reliability as the 
original list of stolen property. 
21. Plaintiff is the owner and should receive any items held by the Court which 
match the list of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on 
Exhibit 24 thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57. The 
bullion which was a part of Exhibit 7 is also a part of the bullion described in Exhibit 57 at 
the trial and all of these items are to be returned to plaintiff. 
22. Co-defendant Eric Aston is the owner of the items not included in the above 
listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at his store. 
23. Plaintiff has incurred costs of court and is entitled to be awarded them from 
the co-defendant Eric Aston. 
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this 
action. 
2. The Court should approve the stipulations of the parties made at the hearing 
regarding ownership of cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment to plaintiff and various 
coins to the co-defendant Eric Aston. 
3. Plaintiff should be awarded all coins which bear an "A" stamp, including all 
of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp, and all items held by the Court 
which match those items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to 
the police. 
7 
4. Plaintiff should also receive any items held by the Court which match the list 
of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on Exhibit 24 
thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57. 
5. Plaintiff should be awarded all of the bullion which was a part of Exhibit 
7 herein, and which was described in Exhibit 57 herein. 
6. All of the above-described items should be ordered returned to the plaintiff. 
7. Co-defendant Eric Aston should be awarded any items not included in the 
above listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at the store. 
8. Plaintiff should be awarded costs of court. 
9. Co-defendant Eric Aston should not be held in contempt for his actions in 
assisting in the sale of the marital home and executing the bill of sale on the various personal 
property contained therein. 
DATED this >^ day of frobr.uarys 1990. 
RATJL HARDING 
D I s M l C T COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ. 
Attorney for Co-defendant Eric Aston 
8 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was faxed to the 
following, this X day of February, 1990. 
Keith W. Meade, Esq. 
525 East 100 South 
Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
SECRETARY 
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Order and Decree 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Utah County. Staie of Utah 
CAnMA 3. SMITH, Clerk 
^ ^ - Depi 
S. REX LEWIS (1953), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
K:Astn-dec.lo 
Our File No. 17,603 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, 
Defendant. 
LISA ASTON and ERIC 
ASTON, 
Co-defendants. 
ORDER AND DECREE 
Civil No. CV 86 1124 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause against co-defendant Eric Aston and plaintiff's 
Motion for an Order directing the delivery of certain personal property to plaintiff came on 
regularly for hearing before the Hon. Ray M. Harding of the above-entitled Court on January 
8, 9 and 22, 1990. The plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis and 
Kevin J. Sutterfield, co-defendant Eric Aston was present and represented by his counsel, 
Keith W. Meade. The Court, having received evidence and heard testimony of the parties and 
other witnesses, considered the memoranda of the parties, heard argument of counsel, having 
issued its Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, being fully advised in the premises, 
good cause appearing therefor, and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following: 
ORDER AND DECREE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The stipulations of the parties made at the hearing herein regarding ownership 
of cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment to plaintiff and various coins to co-defendant 
Eric Aston is hereby approved with each party awarded ownership of those items. 
2. Plaintiff is the owner of all of the coins which bear an "A" stamp, including 
all of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp, and is the owner of the items 
held by the Court which match those items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property 
which was given to the police, more particularly described as follows: 
"A" Stamped Coins: 
1892 P 
1890 
1879 
1871 S 
1914 S 
1881 0 
1890 CC 
1922 D 
1923 S 
1924 S 
1934 D 
1896 S 
1904 S 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Carson City Silver Dollar 
Metric Proof U. S. Dollar 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - St. Gaudins 
1 set Diving Goose Canadian Dollar 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty 
2 
Plaintiff's First List of Stolen Property: 
Complete set of coins of The Golden West (36 coins in set plus 2 Calif, coins). 
U. S. Gold Dollars 
1 1849 - AU 
2 1853 - AU 
S2 1/2 U. S. Gold 
1 1905 - UNC 
1 1915 - AU 
1 1911 - D 
$10 U. S. Gold 
1 1910 - D - UNC 
1 1915 - UNC 
$20 U. S. Gold 
1 1871 - AU 
1 1897 - BU 
1 1914 - S - BU 
1 1925 - BU 
1 18.5 gram Alaska gold nugget 
2,013 oz. silver bullion (1-oz. rounds; 5-oz. bars; 10-oz. bars; 100-oz. bars) 
187 Libertads (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985) 
Canada Dollars 
13 
20 
45 
120 
137 
60 
1 
120 
1958 - BU 
1962 - BU 
1963 - BU 
1964 - BU 
1965 - Type 1 BU, Type 2 BU, Type 3 BU, Type 4 BU and Type 5 BU. 
1966 - LB - BU 
1967 - D.G. 45 s - BU 
1967 - BU 
3 
6 1967 - Canada proof sets with $20 Gold 
470 1984 - proof dollars and case 
U. S. Proof & Gem Silver Dollars 
1 1879 - Metric proof 
5 coins of 13 coin Gem set MS - 65 - CC - dollars consisting of 1-1879; 1-1882; 1-1883; 
1-1884; and 1-1890. 
84 Common dates BU - dollars 
60 Common dates CIRC - dollars 
Miscellaneous Gold 
6 1-oz. - K - Krugeran. 
1 1-oz. - M - Mapleleaf. 
3 Mex - 2 Peso 
3 Mex - 2 1/2 Peso 
2 Mex - 1947 - 50 Peso - BU 
Stamps - one book. 
3. Plaintiff should receive delivery and possession of all items held by the Court 
which match the list of consignment items awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed 
on Exhibit 24 thereof, and which are a part of Exhibit 7 herein and also described in Exhibit 
57 herein. These consignment items are included in the items described in paragraph 2 above. 
4. Plaintiff is the owner of all the bullion which was part of Exhibit 7 herein 
as described in Exhibit 57 herein. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded court costs in the amount of S?A?9.7£ 
4 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that co-
defendant Eric Aston is awarded the items retained by the Court not included in the above 
listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at his store. 
DATED this 
riuiure wniuu 15 uuw m 111s pusses; 
t / day nf Trlii nnrr, 1990. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ. 
Attorney for Co-defendant Eric Aston 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this -/^ day of February, 1990. 
Keith Meade 
525 East 100 South 
5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
^1AJ\ 
SECRET AE^ 
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[5] Further, in viewing all the facts in 
the light most favorable to Brinkerhoff, we 
can find no prejudice. Harris v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 223-23 (Utah 
1983); Moore u Burton Lumber & Hard-
ware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 868 (Utah 1981). 
Brinkerhoff neither below nor on appeal 
articulates how he was prejudiced by DLS's 
failure to notify him in the notice of hear-
ing that the hearing was going to be infor-
mal. It seems clear that no prejudice 
would ordinarily occur when an informal 
hearing is held under the UAPA because 
the litigant has an absolute right to a trial 
de novo before the district court. In this 
trial de novo, Brinkerhoff was able to 
present his entire case before a new tribu-
nal for an independent decision. Based 
upon the foregoing, we find the trial court 
erred in revoking the order of suspension 
by DLS did not state whether the adminis-
trative hearing was to be formal or infor-
mal as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-3(2)(aXv) (1989). 
REASONS FOR THE DECISION 
UNDER SECTION 63-46b-5 
Brinkerhoff also alleges that DLS violat-
ed Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5<lXi) (1989) 
by failing to set forth specific reasons for 
its suspension of his driving privileges. 
This statute states, in pertinent part, that 
"[wjithin a reasonable time after the close 
of an informal adjudicative proceeding, the 
presiding officer shall issue a signed order 
in writing that states the following: . . . (ii) 
the reasons for the decision." 
l&l ^ e dispose oi this issue on similar 
grounds. First, Brinkerhoff failed to raise 
an objection so as to allow DLS to cure any 
defect, and second, Brinkerhoff does not 
claim, let alone demonstrate, that he was 
prejudiced by any alleged error. 
The record below shows that Brinkerhoff 
made no request of DLS to provide him 
with more specific reasons for the suspen-
sion of his license. As stated above, a 
failure to object to an error and allow a 
tribunal to correct its error precludes an 
appellant from asserting the issue on ap-
peal. Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 
778, 781 (Utah 1986); Condas v. Condas, 
618 P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980). 
Finally, Brinkerhoff does not allege, and 
cannot show, prejudice because, under the 
statutory scheme, he was allowed a trial de 
novo after which the trial court has the 
responsibility to enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law justifying its decision. 
In summary, the trial de novo cured any 
technical procedural errors occurring at the 
informal DLS hearing. The purpose of al-
lowing an agency to choose an informal 
hearing procedure would be defeated if 
technical, non-prejudicial, procedural errors 
were sufficient to overturn the agency ac-
tion. The statutory trial de novo is the 
proper remedy to cure these non-prejudicial 
errors. 
and preserve his alleged errors. Further-
more, we hold that the trial de novo in the* 
district court provided by the UAPA elimi-
nated any prejudice to defendant We 
therefore reverse and remand for entry of 
an order to reinstate DLS's suspension of 
Brinkerhoffs driving privileges. 
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Dorothy D'ASTON, et at, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 890050-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 9, 1990. 
Divorce action was brought The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd 
an opportunity to order a continuance to rerae- dy any problem with nonce. 
D'ASTON v. 
Qtc a* 790 PJ2d 590 
L. Park, J., entered judgment, and wife 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
X, held that (1) service on wife's attorney 
of order to show cause why wife should not 
be held in contempt was sufficient where 
wife secreted herself to prevent service of 
order, and (2) wife would be given 30 days 
to bring herself within process of trial 
court, and if she failed to do so, her appeal 
would be dismissed 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Divorce <s=>269(8) 
Service on wife's attorney of order to 
show cause why wife should not be held in 
contempt in divorce proceedings was suffi-
cient where wife initially had been served 
with process in case and appeared by coun-
sel in matter but subsequently secreted 
herself to prevent service of order to show 
cause. 
2~ Divorce <s=>278 
Wife, who had secreted herself and 
refused to submit to process of district 
court in divorce action, would have 30 days 
to bring herself within process of trial 
court if she wished to appeal divorce judg-
ment; however, if wife persisted in secret-
ing herself in violation of trial court orders, 
her appeal would be subject to dismissal. 
Brian C. Harrison (argued), Provo, for 
defendants-appellants. 
S. Rex Lewis (argued), Leslie W. Slaugh, 
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, Provo, for 
plaintiff-appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston, filed an ap-
peal from a divorce decree entered by the 
trial court on December 15, 1988. Appel-
lee, Bruno D'Aston ("Mr. D'Aston"), filed a 
Motion to Dismiss appellant's appeal on the 
grounds that she was currently in con-
tempt of the trial court's order and had 
secreted herself, refusing to submit to the 
D'ASTON Utah 591 
(UtahApp. 1990) 
process of the district court He thus ar-
gues that appellant should not be allowed 
to seek a review of the divorce decree on 
the merits. We agree with Mr. D'Aston 
and therefore stay this appeal and allow 
appellant 30 days from the date of the 
issuance of this opinion to submit to the 
process of the trial court and to give this 
court notice of her actions. If appellant 
complies with this court's order and gives 
this court written verification of her com-
pliance within the 30-day period, then we 
will consider her appeal on the merits. 
However, if appellant fails to submit to the 
process of the trial court within the 30-day 
period, the motion to dismiss her appeal 
will be granted. 
FACTS 
We only discuss the facts relevant to this 
order, not the underlying dispute. 
At the time of trial, appellant testified 
that she had $300,000 in cash in a safe 
deposit box in Far West Bank and $75,000 
in cash in a safe at home. In the divorce 
decree, the trial court ordered appellant to 
pay Mr. D'Aston $236,800 "from the $300,-
000.00 in the safe deposit box." To date, 
appellant has failed to comply with that 
order. 
The trial court issued a writ of execution 
directing the constable to execute on the 
safe deposit box at Far West Bank. The 
constable discovered that no such safe de-
posit box under appellant's name existed, 
nor did she have any substantial assets at 
Far West Bank. 
Mr. D'Aston, on January 11,1989, filed a 
Motion to Compel Compliance with Decree 
of the Court. On January 23, 1989, appel-
lant filed a Motion for Stay and Approval 
of Supersedeas Bond. The trial court or-
dered
 ta stay and set the amount of the 
supersedeas bond, which was to be posted 
within 30 days. Appellant failed to post a 
supersedeas bond. 
Mr. D'Aston, on March 17,1989, obtained 
an Order to Show Cause directing appellant 
to appear and show cause why she should 
not be held in contempt for her failure to 
pay Mr. D'Aston the $236,800 ordered in 
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the decree or to post a supersedeas bond. 
The process server could not find appellant 
is order to serve the Order to Show G^ztse. 
However, her counsel was served with a 
copy of the Order to Show Cause. 
On March 22, 1989, the trial court held a 
hearing on Mr. D'Aston's Motion to Compel 
Compliance. Appellant's counsel was in 
court that day and the judge requested his 
appearance at the hearing. Appellant's 
counsel stated he was making a special 
appearance as he had not been given prop-
er notice of the hearing. 
On April 7, 1989, the court held an order 
to show cause hearing. Neither appellant 
nor her counsel was present. In a minute 
entry, the court noted that the March 22, 
1989, hearing had been continued to April 
7, 1989, and that appellant's counsel had 
been informed of this fact at the March 22, 
1989, hearing. la addition, the record re-
fleets that appellant's counsel was served 
with the Order to Show Cause which listed 
the April 7, 1989, hearing date. 
On April 13, 1989, the court entered find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law holding 
appellant in contempt of court because she 
was "purposefully hiding herself from the 
jurisdiction of the Court and from service," 
and issued an order of commitment and 
bench warrant The court amended its or-
der of commitment on May 26, 1989. Ap-
pellant again evaded service. Appellant's 
counsel, however, was served with the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law and the 
order of commitment 
Thereafter, appellant's counsel made a 
Motion to Strike Findings of Fact, Order of 
Commitment and BencA Warrant fle as-
serts that he does not know where appel-
lant is and that his current representation 
is now limited to this appeal. That motion 
was denied. 
NOTICE 
In response to Mr. D'Aston's motion to 
dismiss her appeal, appellant argues that 
since she has not been served with the 
Order to Show Cause, the trial court was 
1. Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to hold 
that no formal adjudication of contempt is nec-
essary in order to dismiss the appeal for failure 
Without authority to hold her in contempt 
Appellant thus contends this court may not 
dismiss her appeal for failure to comply 
With the trial court's orders. 
[1] Utah courts have acknowledged the 
importance of actual notice in contempt 
Proceedings. Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 
118, 378 P.2d 519, 520 (1963); see generally 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,1171-
?2 (Utah 1988). However, whether a court 
San issue a civil order of contempt without 
personal service where a party purposeful-
ly hides to prevent service of the order has 
Hot been addressed to date in Utah. None-
theless, we are in accord with other juris-
dictions which have held that where a party 
initially has been served with process in a 
Case, and has appeared by counsel in the 
Matter, service of an order to show cause 
^rhy the party should not be held in con-
tempt on the party's attorney is sufficient 
See Kottemann v. Kottemann, 15ft Cat 
4pp,2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 52 (1957); Brewer 
*. Brewer, 206 Ga. 93, 55 S.E.2d 593, 594 
(1949); State ex rel Brubaker v. Pritchr 
drd, 236 Ind. 222, 138 N.E.2d 233, 23fr 
(1956); Caplow i/. Eighth Judicial Dist 
Zourt, 72 Nev. 265, 302 ?2d 755, 7S& 
(1956); Macdermid v. Macdermid, 116 Y.iL 
337, 73 A.2d 315, 318 (1950); see generally* 
Annotation, Sufficiency of notice toy or 
Service upon, contemnor's attorney in 
<Hvil contempt proceedings, 60 A.L.B.2d 
1244 (1958). 
In Kottemann, which is factually similar: 
to this case, the plaintiff had left his rest* 
4ence and thus could not be served witK aa 
Motion for contempt 310 P.2d at 50i Thei 
Plaintiffs attorneys were served witb the 
Motion. Id. at 50-51. The attorneys there 
asserted they did not know the where-^  
abouts of their client and only had authori-
ty to represent him in the appeal. Id. dim 
5l. The court rejected the attorneys" afc| 
^empts to limit their authority and concl^ 
ed that the service of the order to showsjl 
Cause upon the attorneys was proper; i23 
H 52.1 
to comply with a trial court's order. See Tobini 
v. Casaus, 128 Cal.App.2d 588, 275 ?2& 792, 795* 
(1954) (party could not be found for service of 
D'ASTON v. D'ASTON 
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The trial court found that appellant was 
secreting herself to avoid service of pro-
cess in this matter. Appellant's counsel 
was served with notice of the Motion to 
Compel Compliance, the Order to Show 
Cause regarding contempt, and the court's 
findings of contempt. Appellant's counsel 
appeared at the March 22, 1989, hearing on 
the Motion to Compel Compliance and was 
given notice of the Order to Show Cause 
hearing. Because appellant has purpose-
fully hidden to avoid service of process and 
notice of the contempt proceedings and the 
court's order was given to appellant's at-
torney, we find the trial court's order of 
contempt was properly entered. 
CONTEMPT 
[2] Likewise, Utah's appellate courts 
have not considered whether they may dis-
miss a civil appeal when the appellant is in 
contempt of a trial court order in the same 
action. However, in the area of criminal 
appeals, the Utah Supreme Court has dis-
missed the appeal of a prisoner after he 
escaped custody. State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 
703, 704 (Utah 1985); see also Hardy v. 
Morris, 636 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1981) 
(court dismissed an escapee's appeal from a 
dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus). In 
Tuttle, the Utah Supreme Court refined its 
position in Hardy. The court held that an 
appellant prisoner's escape is not an aban-
donment of his right to appeal and that the 
dismissal of his appeal is not an appropri-
ate punishment for his escape. Tuttle, 713 
P.2d at 704-05. The court stressed the 
fundamental right to appellate review of a 
criminal conviction when reinstating the ap-
peal after the prisoner was returned to 
custody. Id. at 705. 
Appellate courts from other jurisdictions 
have dismissed the civil appeals of contu-
macious parties without allowing the par-
ties an opportunity to bring themselves 
into compliance with the trial court's order. 
Rude v. Rude, 153 Cal.App.2d 243, 314 
P.2d 226, 230 (1957) (failure to pay support 
and attorney fees); Kottemann v. Kottem-
ann, 150 CaLApp.2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 53 
process); Pike v. Pike, 24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d 
401, 404 (1946) (party secreted herself and her 
(1957) (failure to pay alimony and attorney 
fees); Michael v. Michael, 253 N.E.2d 261, 
263 (Ind.1969) (appellant took child in viola-
tion of custody order and fled jurisdiction); 
In re Morrell, 174 Ohio St 427, 189 N.E.2d 
873, 874 (Ohio 1963) (appellant took child in 
violation of custody order and could not be 
found); Huskey v. Huskey, 284 S.C. 504, 
327 S.E.2d 359, 360 (Ct.App.1985) (party 
left jurisdiction to avoid arrest). Other 
courts have allowed the party time to com-
ply with the tnal court's order before dis-
missing the appeal. Stewart v. Stewart, 
91 Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962) (30 
days to comply); Tobin v. Casaits, 128 
Cal.App.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795 (1954) (30 
days to comply); Greenwood v. Green-
wood, 191 Conn. 309, 464 A.2d 771, 774 
(1983) (30 days to comply); Pasin v. Pasin, 
517 So.2d 742, 742 (Fla.DistCtApp.1987) 
(15 days to comp/y); In re Marriage of 
Marks, 96 Ill.App.3d 360, 51 IIl.Dec. 626, 
629, 420 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (1981) (30 days 
to comply); Henderson v. Henderson, 329 
Mass. 257, 107 N.E.2d 773, 774 (1952) (30 
days to comply); Prevenas v. Prevenas, 
193 Neb. 399, 227 N.W.2d 29, 30 (1975) (20 
days to comply); Hemenway v. Hemen-
wayr 114 R.L 718, 339 A.2d 247, 250 (1975) 
(30 days to comply); Strange v. Strange, 
464 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex.CivApp.1970) (per 
curiam) (10 days to comply); Pike v. Pike, 
24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d 401, 404 (1946) 
(10 days to comply). " These courts justify 
the dismissal of the appeals on the ground 
that it violates the principles of justice to 
allow a party who flaunts the orders of the 
courts to seek judicial assistance. See, eg., 
Stewart, 372 P.2d at 700; Rude, 314 P-2d 
at 230; Greenwood, 464 A.2d at 773; 
Strange, 464 S.W.2d at 219. 
Still another approach is to stay the ap-
peal until the appellant has submitted to 
the process of the trial court This ap-
proach gives the trial court the flexibility 
to fashion the terms under which the non-
complying party may purge its contempt 
rather than necessarily ordering the en-
forcement of the judgment In Closset v. 
Closset, 71 Nev. 80, 280 P.2d 290, 291 
children to avoid custody order and service of 
process). 
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(1955), the appellant had failed to comply 
with a trial court order in a divorce pro-
ceeding and had been found in contempt 
The Nevada Supreme Court did not dismiss 
his appeal for failure to comply with the 
judgment below, but held that the appeal 
would be dismissed unless the appellant 
within 30 days submitted himself to the 
process of the trial court or posted a super-
sedeas bond. Id. 280 P.2d at 291. The 
court stated: 
[AJppellant husband is now a fugitive 
from process of the trial court We shall 
not permit him to avail himself of judicial 
review while at the same time he places 
himself beyond reach of the process of 
the trial court in defiance of its attempts 
to enforce its judgment 
We do but insist that one seeking the 
aid of the courts of this state should 
remain throughout the course of such 
proceeding, amenable to all judicial pro-
cess of the state which may issue in 
connection with such proceeding. 
Id. at 291 (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court con-
sidered an appellate court's dismissal of a 
civil appeal on the basis that the appellant 
was in contempt of the trial court's order in 
National Union of Marine Cooks & Stew-
ards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 75 S.Ct 92, 99 
L.E& 46 (1954). The Court was asked to 
decide whether the Washington Supreme 
Court violated either the equal protection 
clause or the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment when it dismissed 
an appeal from a money judgment as a 
reasonable measure for safeguarding the 
collectibility of that judgment The appel-
lant had filed a notice of appeal, but had 
offered no supersedeas bond and had ob-
tained no stay of the proceedings. Id. at 
39, 75 S.Ct at 93-94. The trial court or-
dered the appellant to deliver certain bonds 
in Us possession to the court's receiver for 
safekeeping pending disposition of the ap-
peal. Id. The appellant refused and was 
held in contempt Id. As a result, the 
Washington Supreme Court struck the ap-
2. Utah Const, art VIII, § 5 provides, in pertinent 
part: "Except for matters filed onginaily with 
the u^tirfcTTi^  rmirt thw* cKol? k— »« oil ^«—-. «— 
peal on the merits, giving the appellant 15 
days to purge its contempt by delivering 
the bonds. Id. at 40, 75 S.Ct at 94. The 
United States Supreme Court found no con-
stitutional violation, stating that "[w]hile a 
statutory review is important and must be 
exercised without discrimination, such a re-
view is not a requirement of due process." 
Id. at 43, 75 S.Ct. at 95. The Court 
stressed that "[petitioner's appeal was not 
dismissed because of petitioner's failure to 
satisfy a judgment pending an appeal from 
it. It was dismissed because of petitioner's 
failure to comply with the court's order to 
safeguard petitioner's assets from dissipa-
tion pending such appeal." Id. at 44, 75 
S.Ct at 96. 
We are persuaded that the Closset ap-
proach is most consistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's Tuttle decision and the 
United States Supreme Court's Arnold de-
cision. By adopting this approach, we do 
not deny appellant her right to an appeal 
under Utah Const art VIII, § 5,2 but rath-
er insist she must submit herself to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court and satisfy 
that court's concerns before she may exer-
cise that right She merely has the obli-
gation to come forward and offer a reason-
able alternative to the trial court to safe-
guard her assets from dissipation pending 
her appeal. 
Appellant was given the opportunity- to 
post a supersedeas bond, but has refused. 
She has ignored the orders of the trial 
court and, apart from obtaining a tempo-
rary stay which she allowed to lapse for 
want, of a bond, she has provided no rea-
sonable alternative to allow the court to 
insure that her assets are available to satis-
fy the judgment pending appeal. By her 
actions, appellant is frustrating the admin-
istration of justice. 
Appellant has not claimed that she did 
not have the ability to comply with the trial 
court's order. See Stewart v. Stewart, 91 
Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962). This 
situation is similar to one faced by a Cali-
appeal of right from the court of original juris-
diction to a court with appellate jurisdiction 
DUNCAN v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO. 
Cite as 790 PJ2d 595 (UtahApp. 1990) 
Utah 595 
fornia court, where it found it was "dealing 
with a litigant who not only has previously 
failed to appear as ordered, but who up to 
this very time remains a fugitive from jus-
tice. Apparently, he is unwilling to re-
spond to a court order with which he dis-
agrees, but seeks to obtain on appeal" a 
more favorable result Tobin v. Casaus, 
128 Cal.App.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795 
(1954). 
We therefore hold that appellant has 30 
days from the date of the issuance of this 
opinion to bring herself within the process 
of the trial court If appellant submits 
herself to the trial court, she should be 
allowed an opportunity to offer alternatives 
to the trial court to protect the judgment 
Appellant may persuade the court it should 
hold the disputed judgment amount in trust 
until a resolution of this appeal on the 
merits. However, if appellant persists in 
secreting herself in violation of the trial 
court's orders, her appeal will be dismissed 
at the expiration of the 30-day period. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
(O | ttt NUMSfR SYSTEM 2> 
Shelly Bowers; Sherry Bowers; Monica 
Henwood, individually and as personal 
representative of the Estate of Ramon 
Henwood, deceased; Phyllis Henwood; 
and Owen Henwood, Plaintiffs and Ap-
pellants, 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPA-
NY, a corporation; The State of Utah; 
Paul Kleinman; and Does 1 through 
100, inclusive, Defendants and Respon-
dents. 
No. 890291-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 12, 1990. 
Heirs of victims of train-automobile ac-
cident brought action against railroad, De-
partment of Transportation and railroad 
engineer. The Third District Court, Tooele 
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., entered 
summary judgment dismissing wrongful 
death action. Heirs appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, J. Robert Bullock, Senior Dis-
trict Judge, held that (1) heirs failed to 
establish that either engineer or railroad 
were negligent, and (2) Department, having 
given at least some warning or control at 
railroad crossing, was governmentally im-
mune in deciding whether to improve 
means of warning or control at crossing 
because of fiscal effects of decision. 
Affirmed. 
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
Lewis DUNCAN, individually and as per-
sonal representative of the Estate of 
Patrick Duncan,, deceased; Jason E. 
Duncan, a minor by and through his 
Guardian ad Litem; Alice Duncan; No-
reea Duncanr Michael Duncan; 11m 
Duncan; Kevin Duncan; Brian Dun-
can; Michelle Bowers, individually and 
as personal representative of the Estate 
of Jefrey and Nicole Bowers, deceased; 
Judson Bowers; Florence Hanson; 
L Railroads «=> 348(1) 
Evidence failed to support claim of 
heirs of accident victims that there was 
negligence in operation of train or entrust-
ing its operation to engineer who was in 
charge at time of automobile-train collision. 
2. Railroads «=»348<2) 
Evidence did not support claim of heirs 
of accident victims that railroad negligently 
maintained railroad right-of-way^ a t cross-
ing with street where train-automobile colli-
sion occurred; there was nothing to indi-
cate what could have made railroad's right-
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. CV 86 1124 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
The defendant Dorothy D'Aston personally appeared before the Court on the 4th 
day of May, 1990, in person and was represented by her counsel, Brian C. Harrison. 
Plaintiff appeared in person and by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis & Petersen. 
The Court considered its Amended Order of Commitment dated the 26th day of May, 1989, 
together with its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated April 13, 1989, and having 
heard representations made by defendant's counsel, as well as by the defendant, and the 
defendant having previously been found in contempt of an order of this Court, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant may purge herself of the contempt order of this Court by 
depositing with the Court the sum of $236,800.00. The defendant is given ^6 days from May 
4, 1990 to purge herself of her contempt. 
2. In the event the defendant fails to make the aforesaid deposit, the 
defendant is ordered committed to jail for a period of sixty (60) days. 
3. Unless previously modified by an Order of this Court, the Court will review 
the Commitment Order on June 22, 1990, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. at which time the 
defendant is ordered to appear in person before the Court. The Court will make its review 
on that date prior to committing the defendant to jail. 
4. The Bench Warrant previously entered herein on the 13th day of April, 1989 
is hereby withdrawn. 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
L. PARK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fore&oing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of May, 1990. 
Brian C. Harrison, Esq. 
3325 No. University Avenue 
Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
:RETARV SEC l 
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